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Abstract
Background: Calls to a telephone health helpline (THHL) have been previously evaluated for the ability to monitor
specific syndromes, such as fever and influenza-like-illness or gastrointestinal illness. This method of surveillance has
been shown to be highly correlated with traditional surveillance methods, and to have potential for early detection
of community-based illness. Self-sampling, or having a person take his/her own nasal swab, has also proven
successful as a useful method for obtaining a specimen, which may be used for respiratory virus detection.
Methods: This study describes a self-swabbing surveillance system mediated by a nurse-led THHL in Ontario
whereby syndromic surveillance concepts are used to recruit and monitor participants with influenza-like illness.
Once recruited, participants collect a nasal specimen obtained by self-swabbing and submit for testing and
laboratory confirmation. Enumeration of weekly case counts was used to evaluate the timeliness of the self-
swabbing surveillance system through comparison to other respiratory virus and influenza surveillance systems in
Ontario. The operational efficiency of the system was also evaluated.
Results: The mean and median number of days between the day that a participant called the THHL, to the day a
package was received at the laboratory for testing were approximately 10.4 and 8.6 days, respectively. The time
between self-swab collection and package reception was 4.9 days on average, with a median of 4 days. The self-
swabbing surveillance system adequately captured the 2014 influenza B season in a timely manner when compared to
other Ontario-based sources of influenza surveillance data from the same year; however, the emergence of influenza B
was not detected any earlier than with these other surveillance systems. Influenza A surveillance was also evaluated.
Using the THHL self-swabbing system, a peak in the number of cases for influenza A was observed approximately one
week after or during the same week as that reported by the other surveillance systems.
Conclusion: This one-year pilot study suggests that the THHL self-swabbing surveillance system has significant
potential as an adjunct tool for the surveillance of influenza viruses in Ontario. Recommendations for improving system
efficacy are discussed.
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Background
Influenza viruses circulate worldwide and affect people
of all ages causing significant morbidity and mortality
annually. Influenza is believed to spread primarily
through direct person-to-person interactions by way of
large droplets (>5 μm) that are generated when a person
coughs, sneezes, or talks. The large respiratory droplets
that are released into the air can then be inhaled or
ingested. Influenza viruses have also been noted to
spread indirectly through contaminated hands or shared
surfaces [1]. Infection with influenza virus leads to an
acute respiratory disease characterized by the sudden
onset of high fever, coryza, cough, headache, prostration,
malaise, and inflammation of the upper respiratory tract
[2, 3]. While the majority of those who are infected with
the virus only experience mild symptoms, influenza can
lead to severe infection in others.
It is estimated that between 10 and 20 % of Canadians
become infected with influenza each year. In the temper-
ate climates of the Northern Hemisphere, including
Canada, outbreaks generally occur annually between
December and March. These outbreaks or “epidemics”
usually last 8–10 weeks and include one or two “waves”
or peaks of influenza cases with the first wave often the
result of influenza A viruses succeeded by a second wave
of influenza B viruses [1, 4].
In Canada, during the 2014–2015 influenza season,
which includes September through August, 951 hospital-
izations and eight deaths were reported among the
pediatric population (≤19 years), and 6991 hospitaliza-
tions and 597 deaths were reported among the adult
population (≥20 years) [5]. Presumably these numbers
only represent a subset of all influenza-associated hospi-
talizations and deaths, according to approximations that
have been made with national datasets, suggesting the
true number of influenza-related hospitalizations in
Canada approximates 12,200 per year, and the number
of deaths attributable to the disease is closer to 3500 per
year [6, 7]. Given the impact of influenza on the health
care system and the health of Canadians, it is important
to monitor influenza viruses with the intention of pre-
venting a widespread outbreak, especially within the
community where epidemics begin and from which they
spread. In addition, monitoring communicable diseases
provides valuable information that is useful for multiple
reasons, including: vaccine development and evaluation,
allocation of health care associated resources, preparing
health care systems for a surge of cases, tracking disease
spread, informing clinicians, and preventing and con-
taining outbreaks.
Linking telephone health helpline data to laboratory data
National Health Service (NHS) Direct is a national
THHL service provided by the NHS of the United
Kingdom that was used to relay health information to
callers from England and Wales, providing those in need
with advice regarding the appropriate health care services
that should be sought [8]. NHS Direct was explored as a
syndromic surveillance tool between 2001 and 2003 with
an initial focus on detecting a chemical or biologic attack
by monitoring a range of algorithms related to symp-
toms that would relate to such an attack [8, 9]. This
method was successful for detecting elevated levels of
symptom-specific activity; however, the sole use of
symptomatic data to detect an outbreak highlighted
certain limitations, such as the lack of a patient sample
for laboratory confirmation of the agent of interest. This
limitation was later addressed by studies that demon-
strated the feasibility of community-based virological
self-sampling, or self-swabbing, in conjunction with
NHS Direct [10]. Self-swabbing was both acceptable to
participants and feasible with regards to providing ap-
propriate samples for molecular testing based on both
available participant data and the test results from the
returned swabs [10]. A follow-up, opportunistic study
was carried out in England during May and June of
2009, using community self-sampling of callers to NHS
Direct. The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether
the onset of community transmission of pandemic
influenza A (A(H1N1)pdm09) was detected during its
earliest phase by comparing data from self-sampling to
data routinely collected by the Health Protection
Agency (HPA) [11]. This study highlighted that the data
collected via self-sampling was similar to that collected
by the HPA in that they both provided a reliable
indication of the extent local community transmission
was occurring. Additionally, transmission of seasonal
influenza A (H3) and B viruses early in the summer
was also captured, which is a trend that is not com-
monly observed.
Self-sampling for the detection of respiratory viruses
To support the validity of virological evidence derived
from self-sampling, a series of studies have been con-
ducted to evaluate nasal swabs collected through self-
sampling in comparison to clinically derived samples. In
2011, the feasibility of using nasal self-sampling for
population-based surveillance of respiratory virus infec-
tions in the adult working population was explored
through a cohort study performed in Eskilstuna, Sweden
[12]. Participants were asked to collect a sample, which
was then submitted and tested for 14 viruses, upon the
onset of one or more of the following symptoms: fever
(>38 °C), upper respiratory tract infection, and gastro-
enteritis. A total of 876 nasal swabs (47.5 %) contained
at least one virus, and the proportion of positive tests
for specific viruses was shown to be similar to what was
collected clinically.
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In an England-based study during the 2009 influenza
pandemic, self-sampling was implemented to support
community-based virological surveillance of influenza
between May 2009 and March 2010 [13]. Participants
aged 16 or older were recruited for the self-sampling
scheme if they had used NHS Direct and/or the website
interface for cold/influenza symptoms, and those who
agreed to participate submitted a self-obtained nasal
swab that was analysed by real-time RT-PCR for influ-
enza A(H1N1)pdm09, influenza A(H1N1), A(H3N2),
and influenza B. The results from participant-derived
swabs were compared to swabs taken by a clinician,
which demonstrated that there was no significant differ-
ence in cycle threshold (Ct) values between self-sampling
and clinician-led sampling [13]. The equivalence of self-
and staff-collected nasal swabs was also studied among
employees at the Helmholtz Centre for Infection Research
in Germany, which reported that β-actin DNA levels and
the percentage of swabs from which a pathogen was
detected were both slightly higher in self-collected speci-
mens when compared to staff-collected specimens [14].
Both of these studies support the use of self-sampling as
an alternative method for obtaining surveillance data
about respiratory viruses.
Lastly, e-mail-based active syndromic surveillance with
nasal self-swabbing has also been evaluated for the de-
tection of viral respiratory pathogens [15]. Self-swabbing
was deemed highly feasible in terms of “acceptance, sat-
isfaction, compliance, and timeliness” and that delayed
testing as a result of the delay between symptom onset,
self-swabbing, and specimen arrival at the laboratory did
not influence virus detection rates.
Aim of this study
The purpose of this study was to explore the use of Ontar-
io’s THHL, combined with self-swabbing, for the early de-
tection of circulating influenza viruses and to evaluate its
use as a community-based surveillance tool in Ontario.
Currently, in Ontario, community surveillance for influ-
enza viruses is limited at best as it requires patients to
present for health care services to collect data, thus this
system allows for the surveillance of a previously un-
surveyed population. Earlier studies have shown that the
number of calls to telephone health helplines for specific
syndromes such as fever and influenza-like-illness (ILI) or
gastrointestinal illness are highly correlated with trad-
itional surveillance methods and may detect outbreaks
earlier [16, 17]. Moreover, self-swabbing, or having the
person take his or her own nasal swab, has proven suc-
cessful as a useful method for obtaining a specimen for re-
spiratory virus detection [12, 18]. The self-swabbing
surveillance system was evaluated as an early detection
surveillance system in comparison to the Public Health
Agency of Canada’s (PHAC’s) FluWatch, Public Health
Ontario (PHO) laboratory data, and Ontario’s Acute Care
Enhanced Surveillance (ACES) system by comparing the
timeliness of each system in terms of the ability to detect
influenza A or influenza B viruses at the earliest possible
time. This study also evaluated both the feasibility and
efficacy of the self-swabbing surveillance system as a sur-
veillance tool through assessment of system functionality
in terms of timeliness (early detection and reporting delay).
Methods
Recruitment
Using Ontario’s THHL, callers were recruited to partici-
pate in the study provided they met the categories of
“referral” (contact a family physician within 72 h) or
“self-care”. For reference, callers are triaged into five cat-
egories: priority (call 911 immediately), emergency (see
physician within hours), urgent (contact family physician
within 24 h), and the two used for this study. Further, all
participants had to be at least two years of age, and ex-
periencing at least one or more of fever, cough, coryza,
or sore throat. Recruitment began on October 1, 2013
and continued for one full year until September 30,
2014. At the start of recruitment in October 2013, 30
nurses were involved in the recruitment process. On
three subsequent dates, the total number of nurses
recuriting participants was increased: five nurses were
added during the week of December 29, 2013, for a total
of 35 nurses; 85 were added on January 23, 2014, for a
total of 120 nurses; and another 32 were added on
March 5, 2014, for a final total of 152 nurses participat-
ing for the remainder of the recruitment phase of the
study. The number of nurses participating in the study
was outside of the control of the investigator, and the
initial low numbers were consequent to the THHL
provider underestimating the need.
Transfer of data and specimen testing
Upon agreeing to participate, contact information was
provided to THHL personnel, which was transferred
daily via a secure portal to the research team. A “self-
swabbing package” was prepared and shipped out the
next business day to the address on file for the partici-
pant. Each self-swabbing package contained the follow-
ing: a flocked swab (Copan Diagnostics Inc., Murrieta,
CA), two pre-printed labels with unique study number, a
SAFTPAK STP-700 set (one leak proof polybag and one
Tyvek® envelope, SAF-T-PAK Inc., Edmonton, AB), a let-
ter of information about the study, a set of instructions,
a questionnaire, and a consent form. Additionally, an
assent form was included if the participant was under
the age of 16. Briefly, the instructions outlined the
purpose of the study, directions for completing the re-
quired documentation, and how to return the self-
swabbing package. It was requested that participants
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return the nasal swab, questionnaire, and consent (or
assent) forms using the enclosed prepaid packaging.
Packages that were returned without a completed con-
sent (or assent) form were destroyed and recorded in
the database as “returned without consent.”
Upon receipt of the self-swabbing packages by the la-
boratory, the nasal swabs were stored at 4 °C until
tested. Note that participant instructions also recom-
mended storage of swabs at 4 °C following sample col-
lection and prior to return to the laboratory, although
this was not controlled for in this study. Nucleic acid ex-
traction was performed using the Nuclisens® EasyMag®
(Bioméreiux Inc.) in accordance with the instructions
provided by the manufacturer (Nuclisens® EasyMag®
User Manual, version 2.0, ref.280163) producing a 25 μL
eluate. Specimens were then tested for influenza A, in-
fluenza B, and GAPDH (as a control), by RT-PCR using
the Viia™7 Real-Time PCR System (Applied Biosystems).
Timeline
The “symptom start date,” “call date,” “mail out date,”
“collection date,” and “return date” represent points in
time throughout the operation of the self-swabbing sur-
veillance study (Fig. 1) and the difference in the number
of days between each of the time points was calculated.
As the questionnaire database is dependent on partici-
pants who returned a self-swabbing package with con-
sent, the symptom start date and collection date were
not available for those who did not return with consent.
As a result, the difference in the number of days for
certain time points returned a value of less than zero
and were therefore excluded for analyses. Basic statistics
for each of the time points were calculated, which in-
cluded: number of observations included, mean number
of days (and standard deviation), median number of
days, and minimum and maximum number of days. The
results derived for the difference in time between time
points evaluate the efficiency of the self-swabbing sur-
veillance system by providing insight into when delays
occurred in the process, how long it took participants to
go through the steps of the surveillance system, and how
rapidly the self-swab sample could be returned to the
laboratory to be tested.
Time series analyses
In order to assess whether the self-swabbing study was
capable of detecting circulating respiratory viruses in
Ontario earlier than comparable systems within the
province, the surveillance data collected for this study
was compared to the equivalent data provided by
FluWatch, PHO laboratory data, and ACES. A “case” for
the self-swabbing study, FluWatch, and PHO laboratory
data was defined as a positive test for the virus of inter-
est. Two datasets were used for the self-swabbing study,
one with the raw number of cases by week and another
with an adjusted number of cases by week accounting
for the increase in the number of nurses that were
recruiting participants at that time. These two datasets
will subsequently be referred to as the “self-swabbing
dataset” and “self-swabbing adjusted dataset”, respect-
ively. The adjusted dataset was calculated using equation
1 to determine the estimated number of participants that
would have been recruited had 152 nurses been involved
throughout the entire study.
adjusted number of participants
¼ 152 raw number of participantsð Þ
x
ð1Þ
where x = number of nurses recruiting during the week
that the respective participants were recruited.
Two datasets were also used for ACES and therefore
two “case” definitions were used: the first was defined as
a visit to an acute care hospital for a respiratory
syndrome, and the second was a visit to an acute care
hospital for a fever and/or ILI syndrome. The data from
each system was sorted to provide a weekly count of
cases; the reporting weeks used are defined in Additional
file 1. Based on the data available for this study, a peak
comparison method was deemed most appropriate for
the time series analyses. In brief, the peak comparison
method is a comparison of the time at which a peak of
cases or local maximum was observed [19]. The week at
which the peak was observed was used to compare
periods of circulation of respiratory viruses as detected
using the self-swabbing study data, FluWatch, PHO
laboratory data, and ACES.
Results
Timeline assessment
The manner by which the self-swabbing surveillance sys-
tem operates involves various time points that have the po-
tential to impact the time it takes to successfully transition
through the system. To provide a more comprehensive
Fig. 1 Chronological overview of the timeline used to assess the operation of the self-swabbing study
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description of the system’s ability to detect circulating re-
spiratory viruses in a timely manner, the efficiency of the
self-swabbing surveillance system was analyzed based on
time measurements between the various time points in the
process as illustrated in Fig. 1. The mean number of days
between the ‘call date’ and ‘return date’ was 10.4 days and
the median was 8.6 days. The corresponding minimum
and maximum number of days for this interval was 2.2
and 86.6 days. For a more accurate description of the turn-
around time, the time between the ‘mail out date’ and ‘re-
turn date’ was calculated, which had a slightly lower mean
and median of 9.5 and 8.0 days, respectively. The mini-
mum and maximum number of days for this interval was
the same as the time between the call date and package re-
turn date.
On average, participants waited 4.4 days between the
onset of symptoms (‘symptom start date’) to their call to
the THHL (‘call date’). The median for this interval was
slightly lower at 3.0 days, and the minimum and max-
imum number of days was 0 and 55; however, the major-
ity (94.9 %) of participants for which data is available
called less than 2 weeks after symptom onset. Further-
more, more than half of participants (57.4 %) called
within 3 days of symptom onset. After participants
called the THHL, it took an average of 6.1 days to collect
the nasal swab, or a median of 5.0 days. The minimum
and maximum days between call and swab collection
were 2.0 and 62.0 days. Lastly, the mean number of days
between swab collection (‘collection date’) and returning
a package to the testing laboratory (‘return date’) was
just under 5.0 days (4.9 days) or a median of 4.0 days.
The fastest time between swab collection and returning
a specimen was one day and the maximum was
52.0 days. It is important to note that the maximum
value is an outlier and does not reflect the distribution
of this time interval. Approximately 90 % of the speci-
mens received at the laboratory with a swab collection
date reported were received within 8.0 days, and 25 %
were received within 3.0 or less days.
Participant specimen results
A total of 664 out of 666 specimens received with
consent were successfully tested over the course of the
year. Eighty-seven specimens tested positive for influ-
enza (27 influenza A and 60 influenza B) corresponding
to a 13.1 % positivity rate. In comparison, FluWatch had
a very similar overall positivity rate of 13.7 % in Ontario
for the same time period. Moreover, when samples from
peak influenza season only were evaluated (December
2013 to March 2014), an 18.6 % positivity rate was
observed (60 positives: 27 influenza A and 33 influenza
B). Again, this highly resembled the Ontario data derived
from FluWatch, which had an overall positivity rate
during peak influenza season of 18.4 %.
Peak comparison
First, the weekly case count for influenza A viruses was
examined. Both the self-swabbing dataset and self-
swabbing adjusted dataset were used to highlight the dif-
ference between the timing of the curves observed for
the two datasets, with the maximum number of cases
having occurred five weeks earlier at week 2 using the
adjusted dataset. In addition, an artificial smaller peak of
influenza A cases during week 2 was observed using the
raw dataset, which can be attributed to the increase in
recruiting nurses as the global maximum number of
cases using this dataset was during week 7. In compari-
son to the weekly case count for influenza A viruses re-
ported by the PHO laboratory data that peaked during
week 1, the peak for the self-swabbing adjusted dataset
was delayed by one week (Fig. 2, top). The self-swabbing
study data was also compared to FluWatch data, which
reached a maximum weekly number of cases at the same
time as the adjusted number of cases determined by the
self-swabbing study during week 2 (Fig. 2, bottom).
Next, the weekly case count for influenza B viruses
was examined. Only the self-swabbing adjusted dataset
was included as the difference between the raw and ad-
justed numbers had far less of an impact on the seasonal
curves observed for the influenza B season than the
equivalent for influenza A. This is because the change
made to the number of recruiting nurses was smaller
during the influenza B season, for example, there were
120 nurses participating as of week 4 and 152 by week
10. The number of influenza B cases was compared to
laboratory derived data and FluWatch data, which both
had a maximum number of cases occur in week 15 with
129 and 389 cases, respectively (Fig. 3). The maximum
number of influenza B cases was also observed during
week 15 with 43 cases according to the adjusted dataset.
Interestingly, the self-swabbing study appeared to have a
smaller peak in the number of cases prior to the global
maximum, which occurred at week 9 with 22 cases or
six weeks earlier than PHO laboratory data. The earlier
rise in influenza cases was also recorded by FluWatch
data during week 9.
Lastly, the self-swabbing study was compared to two
different measures derived from ACES data: the number
of respiratory visits, and the number of fever and ILI
visits to emergency departments (EDs) in Ontario. The
ACES system uses respiratory, and fever and ILI visits as
an indicator for increased respiratory disease activity. In
addition to the PHO laboratory data and FluWatch data,
these indicators were also used for the evaluation of the
self-swabbing system’s ability to monitor weekly case
counts of influenza A and influenza B viruses in a timely
manner. Only the self-swabbing adjusted datasets were
included in Fig. 4 as the increased number of nurses was
previously addressed . The number of respiratory visits
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reached a maximum during the same week as the
number of fever and ILI visits in week 1, with 9365 visits
and 2622 visits, respectively. Both peaks occurred 1 week
earlier than the peak in cases of influenza A virus
detected by the self-swabbing adjusted dataset, and
6 weeks earlier than the data from the self-swabbing
study using the raw number of cases. ACES detected
only one distinct peak in the number of visits over the
course of the 2013 to 2014 influenza season, which
occurred in week 1; however, a smaller, less defined
increase in respiratory visits was also observed during
week 16 with 7174 visits. Nonetheless, the weekly case
count for influenza B virus that was determined by the
self-swabbing study occurred 1 week earlier in week 15.
Discussion
In summary, the self-swabbing study was able to detect
the seasonality of influenza A viruses at approximately
the same time as FluWatch (week 2) and 1 week later
than the provincial laboratory based data (week 1) when
using the self-swabbing adjusted dataset; however, it did
not capture the same trends any earlier than methods
currently used in practice. With respect to influenza B
viruses, the self-swabbing study was capable of capturing
the seasonal trend at the same time as other systems
currently used in practice. While the maximum number
of cases determined by the self-swabbing study did not
occur any earlier than other sources, a different trend
involving a smaller peak earlier in the season was ob-
served, which was not apparent based on the provincial
laboratory data. These preliminary results show that the
self-swabbing study may have potential for enhancing
current surveillance practices. Additionally, the max-
imum weekly case count for influenza B virus deter-
mined by the self-swabbing study occurred 1 week
earlier during week 15, in comparison to ACES data.
This, in combination with the detection of a different
trend, may suggest that the self-swabbing surveillance
system was better suited for the detection of circulating
influenza B viruses.
Fig. 2 The weekly case counts for influenza A (FluA) viruses detected between October 1, 2013 and September 30, 2014 by: the self-swabbing
study (adjusted dataset) using the date a specimen was tested, and PHO laboratory data (top) and FluWatch (bottom) data. Arrows were used to
indicate when the peak number of cases occurred for each dataset. PHO laboratory data and FluWatch data were plotted on the secondary axis
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The performance of the self-swabbing surveillance sys-
tem for monitoring influenza A viruses was less than
what was anticipated, as the maximum number of cases
was observed at a later week than what was observed for
the other systems in question. The change in the num-
ber of nurses over the course of the study, particularly
during the height of influenza A season, was suspected
to have had an impact on the weekly counts of influenza
that consequently affected the performance of the sys-
tem; however, this could not be confirmed as informa-
tion regarding the recruitment rate of eligible callers was
not available. When the raw case count was used for
analysis, the self-swabbing study was a minimum of
5 weeks later than any other system, but when the num-
bers were adjusted to account for the increased number
of nurses, the peak detected by the self-swabbing study
was found to occur at the same time as FluWatch during
week 2 and 1 week later than provincial laboratory data
and ACES. The lack of recruiting experience among the
nurses early in the study versus much later may also
have impacted these outcomes, such as evidenced by the
more successful monitoring of influenza B virus using
both the raw and adjusted datasets for the number of
recruiting nurses.
The average number of days from call date to collec-
tion date and mail out date to return date was 6.1 and
9.5 days, respectively. It is difficult to control for the
amount of time it takes to transfer a specimen, but it is
important to note that only one testing site was used for
this study. Samples were required to travel from across
the entire province of Ontario to this single site as op-
posed to having multiple, more readily accessible sites
available for specimen submissions. As such, it is likely
that given the proximity of the testing site to the partici-
pant, employing multiple testing sites distributed
throughout the province would consequently lead to a
significant reduction in the time from sample collection,
to shipping, to processing, for these other samples. An-
other intervention that could be used to reduce the time
taken to obtain data for the surveillance system would
be to not only include multiple testing sites, but multiple
sites for participants to return the self-swabbing pack-
ages to. For example, pharmacies or local Public Health
Units could facilitate the transportation of packages to
Fig. 3 The weekly case counts for influenza B (FluB) viruses detected between October 1, 2013 and September 30, 2014 by: the self-swabbing
study (adjusted dataset) using the date a specimen was tested, and PHO laboratory data (top) and FluWatch (bottom) data. Arrows were used to
indicate when the peak number of cases occurred for each dataset. PHO laboratory data and FluWatch data were plotted on the secondary axis
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testing sites by acting as a pick-up/drop-off location for
the self-swabbing packages. By making these adjust-
ments to increase the proximity of the testing site to the
participant, this would likely improve the efficacy of self-
swabbing as an early detection method for surveillance.
The magnitude of such improvements is recommended
for future investigation.
While addressing the timeliness of the system, it is also
worth considering that the surveillance system under
study was not associated with any advertisements or
follow-up reminders to prompt participants to return a
package. The participant following through with the
study was reliant on the participant remembering to act
once a package was received. It would be valuable to
investigate whether incorporating a follow-up procedure
into the study, such as an automated e-mail or phone
reminder, would have an impact on improving the
response rate and reducing the time it took for partici-
pants to return a package.
Self-swabbing also has the potential to provide an
opportunity for the integration of public health and
primary care, and antimicrobial stewardship. A number
of countries, including Canada, have, and continue to,
invest in improving the coordination between public
health and primary care, as both are working towards a
common goal and share healthcare responsibilities, par-
ticularly at the community level [20]. The implementa-
tion of a self-swabbing surveillance system provides an
opportunity for public health authorities to generate
diagnostic information that can be relayed to physicians.
Further, this diagnostic information will aid in the prac-
tice of antimicrobial stewardship, which is an ongoing
issue especially as it pertains to the inappropriate
prescription of antimicrobials for the treatment of viral
infections. A laboratory diagnosis promotes the rational
use of antiviral agents and discourages the inappropriate
prescription of antibiotics, which could in turn poten-
tially reduce inappropriate treatment of influenza-like
illness in up to 50 % of cases [21].
Conclusions
In conclusion, this one-year pilot study, which explored
the use of obtaining specimens viable for testing and
collected by self-swabbing through the use of a THHL,
has been shown to be a practical method for monitoring
influenza viruses in Ontario. Self-swabbing mediated by
Fig. 4 The weekly case counts for influenza A viruses (FluA, top) and influenza B viruses (FluB, bottom) as detected by the self-swabbing study
(adjusted dataset) using the date a specimen was tested, compared to the weekly number of respiratory (resp) visits and fever and ILI (fever/ILI)
visits monitored by ACES from October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014. Arrows were used to indicate when the peak number of cases occurred
for each dataset. ACES data was plotted on the right axis
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a THHL also has the potential added benefit of reducing
the number of visits to physician’s offices and emergency
departments, which would in turn contribute to a
reduction of the rate of viral transmission in a community.
Furthermore, based on its ability to capture community-
based cases in a timely manner, as well as enabling
surveillance of the community based population which is
currently not surveyed, it would be a beneficial addition
the surveillance of influenza viruses in Ontario. Further
investigation into the surveillance system described in this
study is underway and is anticipated to add to more
comprehensive support for future recommendations
regarding the implementation of a community-based
surveillance practice similar to the self-swabbing surveil-
lance system.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Reporting weeks for the 2013-2014 surveillance
season. (DOCX 15 kb)
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